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Abstract. There are three principle paradigms of statistics: Bayesian,
frequentist and information-based inference. Although these paradigms
are in agreement in some contexts, the Lindley paradox describes a class
of problems, models of unknown dimension, where conflicting conclu-
sions are generated by frequentist and Bayesian inference. This con-
flict can materially affect the scientific conclusions. Understanding the
Lindley paradox—where it applies, why it occurs, and how it can be
avoided—is therefore essential to the understanding of statistical anal-
ysis. In this paper, we revisit the Lindley paradox in the context of a
simple biophysical application. We describe how predictive and post-
dictive measures of model performance provide a natural framework for
understanding the Lindley paradox. We then identify methods which
result in optimal experimental resolution for discovery.
1. INTRODUCTION
With advances in computing, Bayesian methods have experienced a strong
resurgence. Proponents of Bayesian inference cite numerous practical and philo-
sophical advantages of the paradigm over classical (frequentist) statistics [1]. The
most compelling argument in favor of Bayesian methods is the natural hedging
between competing hypotheses and parameter values. This hedging mechanism
(i.e. model averaging) protects against over-fitting in singular models and has
led to excellent performance in machine learning applications and many other
contexts, especially those which require the synthesis of many forms of evidence
[1, 2]. But the practical and philosophical problems that motivated the develop-
ment of frequentist methods remain unresolved: (i) There is no commonly agreed
upon procedure for specifying the Bayesian prior and (ii) statistical inference can
depend strongly upon the prior. This dependence creates a discrepancy between
Bayesian and frequentist methods: the Lindley paradox.
We analyze Bayesian model selection with respect to the relative partition of
information between the data and the prior. This analysis leads to novel connec-
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Fig 1. Loss of resolution in Bayesian inference. Panel A: The resolution on detected bead
displacement (the alternative hypothesis) is plotted as a function of sample size N . The increase
in resolution is due to the decrease in the error in the mean σµ = σ/
√
N . The resolution
of both frequentist and Bayesian inference increase, but the frequentist resolution is higher. A
dotted line represents the size of a putative displacement. The frequentist analysis detects this
displacement at a smaller sample size than the Bayesian analysis. Panel B: To draw attention
to the difference between Bayesian and frequentist resolution, we plot the resolution relative to
the frequentist resolution µF . To illustrate the prior dependence of the Bayesian analysis, we
have drawn curves corresponding to various choices of prior volume V0.
tions between Bayesian, information-based, and frequentist methods. We demon-
strate that a large prior information partition results in model selection consistent
with the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [3], while the opposite limit of the
information partition results in model selection consistent with the Bayesian In-
formation Criterion (BIC) [4]. Intermediate partitions interpolate between these
well known limits. Although the AIC limit is well defined and robust, the BIC
limit depends sensitively on the ad hoc definition of a single measurement. Fur-
thermore, the BIC limit corresponds to a loss of resolution. This loss of resolution
might result in the unnecessary purchase of more sensitive equipment or the col-
lection of unreasonable sample sizes.
As a result, we question the suitability of BIC model selection (or Bayesian
inference with an uninformative prior) at finite sample size. The large-prior-
information regime of Bayesian inference can be achieved in almost any practical
Bayesian implementation by the use of pseudo-Bayes factors[5, 6]. This approach
circumvents the Lindley paradox while maintaining many advantages of Bayesian
inference.
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1.1 A simple example of the Lindley paradox
A simple example emphasizes the difference between Bayesian and frequentist
forms of statistical support for models of unknown dimension. Suppose an ob-
server measures the position of a bead in the course of a biophysics experiment.
The position is first determined with negligible uncertainty. After a perturbation
is applied, N measurements are made of the bead position: xN ≡ (x1, x2, ..., xN ).
The N measurements are assumed to be independent and identically distributed
(iid) in a normal distribution centered on the unknown true displacement µ with
known variance σ2 where µ = 0 if the bead is unmoved and µ 6= 0 otherwise.
In the Bayesian paradigm, we must specify priors over the parameters for the
two models pii(θ). Model zero (null hypothesis) is parameter free since µ = 0,
but model one (alternative hypothesis) is parameterized by unknown mean µ.
The true value µ0 is unknown and to represent this ignorance, we use a vague
conjugate prior, choosing a normal prior centered on zero with a large variance
τ2. A canonical objective Bayesian approach to model selection is to assume the
competing models have equal prior probability. The model with the largest pos-
terior probability is selected. The experimental resolution for detecting a change
in the bead position is then:
(1.1) |µˆ| > σµ ·
√
2 log τ/σµ,
while the frequentist rule of thumb (≈ 95% confidence level) for rejecting the null
hypothesis is:
(1.2) |µˆ| > σµ · 2,
where σµ ≡ σ/
√
N is the uncertainty in µ. The difference between the conditions
defined by Eqns. 1.1 and 1.2 reveals that the paradigms may come to conflicting
conclusions about model selection, as illustrated in Fig. 1. D. Lindley emphasized
this conflict by describing the following scenario: If the alternative hypothesis is
true, for a suitable choice of τ and sample size N , the null hypothesis could be
simultaneously (i) rejected at a 95% confidence level and (ii) have 95% posterior
probability [7]! This conflict between statistical paradigms has been called the
Lindley paradox.
Many practitioners of Bayesian inference believe that priors may be a formal
necessity but have minimal influence on inference. For instance, the posterior
probability for µ is independent of the prior in the uninformative limit τ → ∞.
However, as we see in Eqn. 1.1, inference on model identity remains critically
dependent on the prior (value of τ). In the limit that τ →∞, no finite observed
displacement µˆ is sufficient to support the alternative hypothesis that the bead
has moved! This paradoxical condition is called the Bartlett paradox [8].
2. DATA PARTITION
2.1 The definition of frequentism and Bayesian paradigms
We wish to study a generalized class of decision rules that include methods
from all three paradigms of inference. In the current context, we will use the log
likelihood ratio:
(2.1) λ(xN ) ≡ h0(xN |θˆx)− h1(xN |θˆx),
4 C. H. LAMONT AND P. A. WIGGINS
as a frequentist test statistic where h is the Shannon information h ≡ − log q and
θˆx is the maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters of the respective model.
We shall define a decision rule:
(2.2) λ(xN ) < λ∗,
to select model zero where λ∗ is the critical value of the test statistic. We will refer
to the decision rule as frequentist if λ∗ is sample-size independent in the large-
sample-size limit of a regular model. This definition includes both the frequentist
Neyman-Pearson likelihood ratio test as well as the information-based paradigm
(AIC). In the Bayesian paradigm, we will define the decision rule in terms of the
log-Bayes factor:
(2.3) λB(x
N ) ≡ h0(xN )− h1(xN ),
where q(xN ) is the marginal likelihood and h(xN ) is the respective Shannon infor-
mation. We define the decision rule: λB(x
N ) < 0 to select model zero. Although
the Bayes factor is not a test statistic—an orthodox Bayesian approach is to
compute a posterior on model identity—the decision rule captures how the Bayes
factor is typically used in practice.
In the large-sample-size limit, the Bayesian decision rule is equivalent to Eqn. 2.2
with λ∗ proportional to logN to leading order in N . Therefore, we will define a
decision rule Eqn. 2.2 as Bayesian if the critical test statistic λ∗ is sample-size
dependent. This definition includes standard Bayesian model selection as well as
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).
2.2 Prior information content
The paradoxically-large displacement needed to select the alternative hypoth-
esis is a consequence of the uninformative prior (τ → ∞). To be more precise
about the descriptors informative and uninformative, we can compute expected-
parameter-information content of the data set xN [9]:
(2.4) I(xN ) ≡ Eθ
pi(·|xN )
log pi(θ|xN )/pi(θ),
which is equal to the KL Divergence of the posterior and prior. I ≥ 0 and will
increase with sample size. Given N new measurements, we call the prior pi unin-
formative if I is large.
A standard approach to specify an informative prior is the elicitation of a
prior from an expert [1]. It is convenient to make the concrete assumption that
the expert knowledge is the result of previous measurements, which we can write
explicitly xNT . Our posterior on these measurements pi(θ|xNT ) is computed from
some suitably flat prior pi(θ). The xNT is then used to construct a new informative
prior:
(2.5) pi′(θ) ≡ pi(θ|xNT ),
where the primed distributions are computed with respect to the informative prior
(Eqn. 2.5). This Bayesian update rule was concisely summarized by D. Lindley:
Today’s posterior is tomorrow’s prior.
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Let the new measurements made be re-labeled xNG . We can re-compute the
marginal likelihood q′ using the new prior pi′. q′ has a second interpretation, the
Bayesian predictive distribution computed from the original prior pi:
(2.6) q′(xNG) = q(xNG |xNT ) ≡ q(xN )/q(xNT ),
where xN represents the entire data set of N = NG + NT measurements. This
distribution is predictive since it predicts or generalizes on data set xNG given a
training data set xNT . Adjustment of the data partition between the training set
(size NT ) and the generalization set (size NG) can be understood as adjusting the
information content of the prior. If NG  NT , the prior is uninformative relative
to the data.
2.3 The Bayesian cross entropy
The general problem of predicting observations xNG , conditioned on xNT where
N = NG +NT is closely related to a natural metric of performance: a predictive
cross entropy [10]
(2.7) HNG|NT ≡ NNG EXp(·) h(X
NG |XNT ),
where p(xN ) is the true distribution of observations xN . The cross entropy is
rescaled to correspond to the total sample size N . We can view model inference
using the evidence Eq. 2.6 as choosing the model which is estimated to have
the optimal performance under this metric. Since H can only be computed if the
true distribution p is known, it will be useful to empirically estimate it. A natural
estimator is the leave-k-out estimator [11]
(2.8) HˆNG|NT (xN ) ≡ NNG EX
P{xN}
h(XNG |XNT ),
where Hˆ estimates H and the empirical expectation E is taken over all unique
permutations of the observed data between the training and generalization sets.
This estimator uses cross validation: there is no double use of data since the
same observations never appear in both the generalization and training sets.
Methods like empirical Bayes [12–14], where the prior is fit to the data to maxi-
mize the evidence, implicitly use the data twice and are therefore subject to the
same over-fitting phenomenon as maximum likelihood estimation.
2.4 Pseudo-Bayes factors
The natural strategy would be to compute the model posterior probability (or
Bayes factor) using the evidence q′(xNG). But, for small NG, h(xNG |xNT ) typically
exhibits large statistical fluctuations since only a small fraction of the data xNG is
used for inference on the model identity even though there is more non-redundant
information encoded in xNT . To re-capture this missing information, we replace
h(xNG |xNT ) with HˆNG|NT . Therefore, in analogy with the log Bayes factor, the log-
pseudo-Bayes factor is defined [11]:
(2.9) λ
NG|NT
PB (x
N ) ≡ HˆNG|NT0 − HˆNG|NT1 ,
which depends on the data partition NG and NT . We define the decision rule:
λPB(x
N ) < 0 to select model zero.
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Fig 2. Complexity as a function of data partition. Complexity can be understood as
a penalty for model dimension K. The data partition parameter controls the relative amount
of information in the prior. In a predictive limit (ν → 0), the training set is large compared
with the generalization set and the complexity is small. This is the AIC limit. At the other
extreme (ν → ∞), all the data is partitioned into the generalization set and therefore the prior
is uninformative and the complexity is large. This is the BIC limit.
Two data partitions have been discussed in some detail. A maximal-traning-set
limit, where NT = N −1 and NG = 1, corresponds to Leave-one-out cross valida-
tion (LOOCV) and has been studied extensively [5, 6, 11, 15, 16]. A mininimal-
training-set limit has also been explored in which NT is as small as possible such
that pi′ is proper [17, 18].
We focus on the example of a pairwise model selection to compare with canon-
ical frequentist inference, but a selection among any number of models can be
performed by selecting the model with the smallest cross-entropy estimator.
2.5 Information Criteria
To systematically investigate the dependence of inference on the data partition
in the pseudo-Bayes Factor, we propose a novel estimator of the cross entropy
H whose dependence on the data partition is explicit. The data partition will be
parameterized by ν ≡ NG/NT . We define a generalized Information Criterion:
(2.10) ICν(xN ) ≡ h(xN |θˆx) +Kν ,
where the complexityKν is the bias, chosen to make IC
ν an unbiased estimator of
HNG|NT . The log-pseudo-Bayes Factor can be constructed using the information
criterion. The information criterion is typically much easier to evaluate than the
leave-k-out formulation. Since the first term in the definition of ICν is independent
of ν, the data-partition dependence is completely characterized by the complexity
Kν .
Assuming pi is uninformative and q(xN |θ) is a regular model in the large sample
size limit, the Laplace approximation holds and the complexity has a simple form:
(2.11) Kν =
1
2K
[
1 + (1 + ν−1) log(1 + ν)
]
,
which is only a function of the parameter-space dimension K and the data parti-
tion ν. The complexity is plotted as a function of the data partition ν in Fig. 2.
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Fig 3. Significance level as a function of data partition. To make an explicit connection
between the frequentist significance level and the data partition, it is useful to compute the sig-
nificance level implied by the predictive decision rule. In the postdictive regime, corresponding to
an uninformative prior, the significance level steeply decreases with increasing ν, resulting in a
strong Lindley paradox.
2.6 Decision rules and resolution
With the information criterion above, we can connect a (pseudo-)Bayes factor
with a particular data partition ν to an effective decision rule. We choose model
one if
(2.12) h0(x
N |θˆx)− h1(xN |θˆx) > ∆Kν ,
where ∆Kν is the difference in the complexity of the models. We can also connect
these decision rules to choices of a frequentist significance level as described in
the supplement. A plot of this function for two different values of ∆K is shown
in Fig. 3. Of particular practical experimental importance is the minimal signal
to noise ratio at which our decision rule will choose a larger model. Returning
to the biophysical problem described in the introduction, the minimal resolvable
bead displacement is
(2.13) |µˆ| > σµ ·
√
1 + (1 + ν−1) log(1 + ν)
where the RHS is the inverse resolution. The resolution is monotonically decreas-
ing in ν. The smallest ν gives us the highest resolution.
3. THE LINDLEY PARADOX
The Lindley paradox can be understood from the perspective of the relative
partition of information between the prior and the data. By defining the com-
plexity (Eqn. 2.11), we can explore the partitioning of this data by studying the
decision rule and resolution as a function of the partition ν.
3.1 Classical Bayes and the Bartlett paradox
For the classical Bayes factor, NT = 0 or ν → ∞. If the prior is flat on an
infinite-volume parameter manifold, the complexity Kν becomes infinite. This
scenario always favors the smaller model, regardless of the goodness of fit, result-
ing in the Bartlett paradox.
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Fig 4. The geometry of the Occam factor. The total volume of plausible parameter values
for a model is V0. The volume of acceptable parameter values after a single measurement is V1.
The volume of acceptable parameter values after N measurements is VN . The Occam factor is
defined as the probability of randomly drawing a parameter from initial volume V0 consistent with
the N measurements: Pr ≈N−1 where N≡ V0/VN is the number of distinguishable distributions
after N measurements. Lower dimension models are naturally favored by the Occam factor since
the number of distinguishable models N is smaller.
If the parameter-manifold volume V0 is finite, so is the complexity. In the large
sample size limit, the marginal likelihood can be written in an intuitive form:
(3.1) q(xN ) = VNV0 × q(xN |θˆx),
where VN is the volume of parameter manifold consistent with the data x
N and
θˆx is the maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters. (We define this volume
more precisely in the supplement.) The first factor on the RHS is the Occam factor
or the probability of randomly drawing a parameter (consistent with xN ) from
the prior distribution pi. Complex models (large K) with uninformative priors
have small Occam Factors, due to the large volume of plausible parameters (V0),
relative to the volume of the parameter manifold consistent with the observations
(VN ). Large Occam factors give rise to a natural mathematical realization of the
Occam Razor: Among competing hypotheses, the one with the fewest assumptions
[parameters] should be selected [12]. This effect is illustrated schematically in
Fig. 4. Both infinite and finite-but-large-volume parameter manifolds can give
rise to strong Lindley paradoxes.
3.2 Minimal training set and Lindley Paradox
We might use a minimal training set to remove the dependence on the po-
tentially divergent volume V0 [19] which corresponds to the large-data-partition
limit: ν  1. It is difficult to define this minimal training set in a satisfactory way
[20]. The most natural option is to set NT = 1 and NG = N − 1, which results in
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) [4]:
(3.2) BIC(xN ) ≡ h(xN |θˆx) + K2 logN,
in the large-sample-size limit. We can compute a limit on the smallest resolvable
change in position:
(3.3) |µˆ| > σµ ·
√
logN,
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which is free from the ad hoc volume V0 of the uninformative prior. This approach
resolves the Bartlett paradox, but leads to a strong Lindley paradox—conflict
with Frequentist methods in some critical range of sample sizes.
The logN dependence of BIC results in some troubling properties. If we now
bin pairs of data points, the empirical mean µˆ and the standard error σµ are
unchanged, but N → N/2, changing the complexity and therefore the decision
rule and resolution. Therefore, although BIC does not depend on the choice of
prior support, it does depend on an ad hoc choice as to what constitutes a single
sample.
3.3 Frequentist prescription and AIC
The complementary limit describes a maximal training set (ν → 0). In this
limit, ICν corresponds to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC):
(3.4) AIC(xN ) ≡ h(xN |θˆx) +K,
where the complexity is equal to the dimension of the parameter manifold K. This
leads to a sample-size-independent critical value of the test statistic in Eqn. 2.2,
and is therefore frequentist. Like the log-Occam factor, K can be reinterpreted
as a penalty for model complexity that gives rise to a distinct information-based
realization of the Occam Razor: Parsimony implies predictivity.
The smallest resolvable change in position using AIC is
(3.5) |µˆ| > σµ ·
√
2.
AIC can also be viewed as the performance of the model against the next ob-
servation xN+1 [10]. For this reason, ν → 0 is called the predictive limit. The
canonical Bayesian approach estimates the marginal likelihood of the observed
data xN from the prior. It is therefore postdictive. We therefore call ν →∞ the
postdictive limit. The AIC and BIC penalties are often used as complimentary
heuristics in model selection [21]. Our cross entropy description shows that they
can be interpreted as Bayesian objects which differ only in the choice of data
partition ν.
The predictive limit is expected to result in maximum resolution and consistent
inference (i.e. independent of the prior and data partition). Unlike BIC, it is
essentially independent of data binning in the large sample size limit. (See Fig. 2.)
Although AIC is computed using a point estimate, a pseudo-Bayes factor for
NG = 1 and NT = N −1 (i.e. LOOCV) corresponds to the same predictive limit.
3.4 Log evidence versus AIC
A convenient heuristic for understanding the relation between AIC and the
log evidence can be understood from the relation between the cross entropy us-
ing H1|N−1 and HN |0 which are estimated by AIC and h(xN ) respectively. If we
approximate the finite difference in H1|N−1 as a derivative in the large N limit,
H1|N−1 can be approximated:
(3.6) H1|N−1 = N∂NHN |0 + O(N−1).
Therefore, we can understand the relation between the conflicting information
criteria AIC and BIC in the following way: AIC is the derivative of BIC.
10 C. H. LAMONT AND P. A. WIGGINS
Lindley 
Paradox
more informative
less informativeCr
os
s E
nt
ro
py
 D
iff
er
en
ce
: H
0– 
H
1 
Sample Size (N )
Postdiction: N|0
Prediction:  1 |N–1
min
0
–2
–4
2
4
103102 104 105
Fig 5. Visualizing the pre and postdictive decision rules. The cross entropy difference
for Bayesian inference (postdiction: N |0) and the predictive limit (1|N − 1) are plotted as a
function of sample size N . ∆H > 0 results in the selection of the alternative hypothesis. Both
measures initially favor the null hypothesis. The use of a more (less) informative prior causes the
postdictive curve to be shifted up (down). Since the predictive H is the derivative of the postdictive
H, the prior does not influence the inference of the predictive observer. The predictive curve
crosses zero first, leading the predictive observer to support the alternative hypothesis. Since the
predictive H is the derivative of the postdictive H with respect to N , the sample size at which the
predictive observer switches to the alternative hypothesis corresponds to the sample size where
the postdictive observer has the most evidence for the null hypothesis. The two measures are in
conflict (grey region) until the postdictive H crosses zero at a significantly larger sample size N .
The Bayesian therefore requires significantly more evidence to reach the same conclusion as the
predictive observer.
This heuristic can naturally explain why AIC is free from the strong prior
dependence which leads to the Lindley paradox. In the context of an uninforma-
tive prior, the expected log evidence HN |0 has an ambiguous offset corresponding
to the prior choice, leading different individuals to make different inference on
the model identity. H1|N−1, estimated by AIC, is independent of the unknown
constant since the slope of HN |0 is independent of its offset. This relationship is
illustrated schematically in Fig. 5.
A second interesting feature of the heuristic relates to the sample size depen-
dence of the predictive and postdictive decision rules. The sample size at which
the predictive statistician begins to favor the alternative hypothesis corresponds
to the same sample size at which the postdictive statistician has maximum confi-
dence in the null hypothesis! (See Fig. 5.) The difference between a function and
its derivative explains both the connection and inconsistency of the predictive
and postdictive decision rules.
3.5 When will a Lindley paradox occur?
We stated that the Lindley paradox is a consequence of an insufficiently in-
formative prior, but we have studied differences in the performance of predictive
and postdictive decision rules. We now discuss the connection between these
equivalent formulations. Let us define the difference between the predictive and
postdictive cross entropy:
(3.7) I ′(xN ) ≡ Hˆ1|N−1 − HˆN |0.
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In the large-sample-size limit, we can express I ′ in terms of the expected-parameter-
information content of the data I:
(3.8) I ′ = I(xN ) + O(N0),
as shown in the supplement. I ′, the mismatch between pre and postdictive mea-
sures of performance, can be interpreted as the missing information from an
uninformative prior I. The missing information is only missing before sample xN
is observed. A model may be extremely predictive, even if the missing information
was infinite, once xN has been observed.
4. DISCUSSION
By defining a novel information criterion that estimates the cross-entropy, we
established a continuous bridge between canonical Bayesian and information-
based model selection defined in terms of a data-partition between training and
generalization data sets. The strength of the Lindley paradox, the mismatch
between Bayesian and frequentist inference on hypotheses, can be re-interpreted
in terms of prior information content (i.e. the data partition). We studied the
properties of model selection with respect to the data partition. Two solutions
to the Lindley paradox have been widely discussed: (i) adapt the frequentist
paradigm by making the significance level sample-size dependent [22] or (ii) adapt
the Bayesian paradigm by making the prior sample-size dependent. We advocate
for taking the second approach.
4.1 A canonical Bayesian perspective on the Lindley paradox
It is important to acknowledge that the Bayesian perspective on the Lindley
paradox is valid. Returning to the biophysical example, if we interpret the al-
ternative hypothesis precisely, we define a uniform prior probability density over
an infinite-volume manifold in the uninformative limit (τ and V0 → ∞). There-
fore, the a priori probability of picking a displacement consistent with the data
(≈ VN/V0) is vanishingly small in the alternative hypothesis. Fine tuning would
be required to make µˆ finite and therefore the null hypothesis is strongly favored,
whatever µˆ.
In this context, the Bayesian perspective is correct and intuitive. This ap-
proach is useful in many contexts where we have a precisely defined alternative
hypothesis. However, this interpretation of the alternative hypothesis is not what
the authors intended. Although we wished (i) to allow a large range of putative
parameter values, we also unintentionally specified a corollary: (ii) a vanishingly
small prior density on the parameter manifold. In our conception of the statistical
problem, we are not interested in testing any precise model for the distribution of
µ (e.g. diffusion, stage drift, etc) as a requisite for determining whether the bead
movement can be detected. If possible, we wish to achieve condition (i) without
the corollary (ii). The predictive formulation of inference can achieve this goal.
The vanishingly small prior density subtracts out of the predictive cross entropy
as illustrated in Sec. 3.4.
4.2 Circumventing the Lindley paradox
By partitioning the data into a training and generalization partition in the
pseudo-Bayes factor, we are able to circumvent the most severe forms of the Lind-
ley paradox by generating inference that is prior independent (for sufficiently large
12 C. H. LAMONT AND P. A. WIGGINS
sample sizes). The postdictive limit depends sensitively on the data partition, but
the predictive limit does not. Fig. 2 shows that for sufficiently large sample size N ,
the complexity rapidly converges to its limit as ν → 0 for NG < NT . Due to this
convergence, two researchers will report the same predictive pseudo-Bayes factor,
even if they make different decisions about the prior and the data partition.
Our discussion of the Lindley paradox focusses mainly on critiques of a Bayesian
perspective and the defense of a frequentist perspective on hypothesis testing or
model selection. In fact the frequentist perspective we discuss includes methods
from all three paradigms of inference. Our criticism of the Bayesian paradigm
is confined strictly to a criticisms of the use of Bayes factors and their un-
desirable consequences on model selection, as described above. However, the
Bayesian paradigm offers many strengths. The posterior is an elegant and in-
tuitive framework for representing parameter uncertainty. Furthermore, hedging
between parameter values (and models) typically leads to superior frequentist
performance relative to point estimates. Finally, the Bayesian paradigm offers a
coherent framework for combining different types of data. Therefore we advocate
retaining as many of these advantages as possible while eliminating paradoxical
behavior in the context of model selection. The pseudo-Bayes factor has these
desired properties.
Predictive methods (the information-based paradigm and predictive pseudo-
Bayes factor) also circumvent many criticisms of the classical frequentist proce-
dure: (i) Observed data that is unlikely in both the alternative and null hypothesis
results in the rejection of the null hypothesis. (ii) An ad hoc confidence level must
be supplied. (iii) Only pairwise comparisons between models can be made. (iv)
A null hypothesis must be defined. The predictive approach circumvents each of
these criticisms. Predictive methods also have provable asymptotic efficiency in
terms of cross entropy loss in typical modeling situations[23], a feature which we
discuss in the supplement.
4.3 Loss of resolution
To place the discussion of experimental resolution in context, it is useful to re-
member that biophysicists will routinely pay thousands of dollars more for a 1.49
NA versus a 1.4 NA objective with nominally a 6% increase in the signal-to-noise
ratio. This obsession with signal-to-noise ratio might suggest that a similar effort
would be expended to optimize the resolution of the experimental analysis to ex-
ploit the data as efficiently as possible, especially in the context of single-molecule
experiments where the sample size is often extremely limited. The Bayesian for-
mulation of inference can imply a prohibitively stringent significance level for the
discovery of new phenomena. The frequentist formulation of inference is tuned
for discovery in the sense that it explicitly controls for the largest acceptable
false positive probability. The Bayesian may require a much larger sample size to
detect the same phenomena, as illustrated in Figs. 1, 5 and 3.
4.4 The multiple comparisons problem
We have demonstrated that predictive inference has a lower threshold for dis-
covery, but proponents have argued that the loss of resolution is in fact a feature
rather than a flaw of the Bayesian paradigm. There is a perception that the
canonical frequentist significance test is too weak and leads to spurious claims of
discovery. An important and subtle problem with Frequentist significance test-
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ing is the multiple comparisons problem (multiplicity). For instance, if 20 inde-
pendent false hypotheses for tumor genesis were independently tested at a 95%
confidence level, one would expect spurious support for one of these hypotheses.
Multiplicity can arise in more subtle contexts: Hypotheses (or priors) are modi-
fied after some results are known in the course of research, often unconsciously.
In singular statistical models, there is often implicit multiplicity in the maximum
likelihood estimation procedure [2, 24, 25]. The peer-review process itself may fa-
vor the most extreme results among multiple competing articles. In exact analogy
to the tumor genesis example, multiplicity can result in the spurious selection of
the alternative hypothesis in each of these cases.
These false discoveries are a consequence of using an incorrect frequentist
significance test [26]. For instance, we have described how the complexity in
information-based inference must be modified in the context of a singular model
[24, 25]. (e.g. [27]). From a frequentist perspective, the significance test must re-
flect the presence of multiple alternative hypotheses which leads to corrections
(e.g. Bonferonni correction [26]). These corrections increase the critical test statis-
tic value to reflect the true confidence level of the test in the context of multiple
alternative hypotheses. In summary, the failure of frequentist methods due to
un-corrected multiplicity is not a flaw in the frequentist paradigm but rather a
flaw in its application. Bayesian inference can naturally circumvent some of these
problems in a principled way, but in many applications there are parameters for
which one must supply an uninformative prior. As a result, the effective confi-
dence level is ad hoc. If multiplicity is the source of spurious false discoveries, a
principled approach is to correct for this problem explicitly.
4.5 Statistical significance does not imply scientific significance
Simpler models are often of greater scientific significance. Therefore there is a
perception that frequentism is flawed because it typically assigns higher statistical
significance to larger models, relative to the Bayesian paradigm. This perception
conflates statistical and scientific significance. Almost all natural systems appear
to be described by models with a clear hierarchy of effect sizes [28]. Scientific
progress is achieved by studying the largest effects first, irrespective of the statis-
tical significance of smaller effects. The selection of effects to include in a model
is a matter of judgment and scientific insight. There are important non-statistical
systematic sources of error that must be considered. If sample size is large enough,
these systematic effects will suggest the use of a larger model from a predictive
standpoint, even if the larger model is not scientifically relevant [29]. Statistics
supplies only a lower bound on scientific significance by determining whether a
hypothetical effect can be explained by chance.
4.6 Conclusion
Bayesian inference can be powerful in many contexts, especially in singular
models and in the small-sample-size limit where point estimates are unsuitable
[2]. But Bayesian inference can result in strong conflict with frequentist inference
when uninformative priors are used. When a Bayesian analysis is desired, we
advocate the pseudo-Bayes factor method [11] for inference on model identity with
a small ratio ν of generalization to training set sample size. We demonstrate that
only in this predictive limit can inference be expected to be consistent between
independent analyses. This approach is fully Bayesian for parameter inference,
14 C. H. LAMONT AND P. A. WIGGINS
but free from the Lindley paradox. Therefore it preserves all of the advantages
of Bayesian methods without the risk of paradoxical inference on model identity
and optimizes experimental resolution.
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APPENDIX A: CALCULATION OF COMPLEXITY
In the large sample-size limit of a regular model, we can view a model as a flat
prior on some subspace Θ of dimension K embedded in a larger parameter space
J + K. The marginal likelihood of N measurements with dimension J + K can
then be written as;
q(XN ) =
∫
dJθ⊥ δJ(θ⊥ − θ0⊥)
∫
dKθ‖
exp
−∑i(Xi−θ)2
2σ2
(2piσ2)N(K+J)/2
(A.1)
Which gives for the predictive distribution,
h(XNG |XT ) = h(XN )− h(XNT )(A.2)
=
∑
i(X
i
⊥ − θ0⊥)2
2σ2
+
NG(J +K)
2
log 2piσ2(A.3)
+
K
2
log
N
NT
+
SN − SNT
2σ2
Where SNT , is the sum of (projected) squared deviations from the (projected)
mean µNT = N
−1
T
∑
i∈NT X
i
‖. A straightforward calculation shows that
SN − SNT − SNG =
NTNG
N
(µˆNT − µˆNG)2(A.4)
Expanding around θ0, where θ0 is the parameter in the manifold Θ minimizing
the KL divergence from the true distribution p(·),
h(XNG |XT ) = h(XNG |θ0) + K
2
log
N
NT
− N
2
G
N
(µˆNG − θ0)2
2σ2
+(A.5)
NGNT
N
(µˆNT − θ0)2 − 2 (µˆNG − θ0) (µˆNT − θ0)
2σ2
.
The deviance terms cancel under expectation. After rescaling, we can write,
N
NG
h(XNG |XT ) = h(XN |θ0) + K
2
N
NG
log
N
NT
.(A.6)
Defining ν = NG/NT emphasizes the limit behavior
N
NG
h(XNG |XT ) = h(XN |θ0) + K
2
(1 + ν−1) log (1 + ν) .(A.7)
The term h(XN |θ0) is estimated by the observed information at MLE h(xN |θˆx).
The error in this estimator (training error) is again 12χ
2(K) distributed [3], mak-
ing the following estimator unbiased
h(XN |θ0) =ˆh(xN |θˆx) + K
2
.(A.8)
When Eqn. A.8 is used with Eqn. A.7, it gives us an information criterion corre-
sponding to the pseudo-Bayes Factor for each partition choice ν.
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APPENDIX B: DEFINITIONS AND CALCULATIONS
B.1 Volume of a distribution
Our intuitions about the volume of a distribution can be made mathematically
precise using the self-entropy S. The self entropy functional is defined as
(B.1) S [q(·)] ≡ −
∫
dθ q(θ) log q(θ),
and the volume is defined in turn as
(B.2) Vq ≡ e−S[q(·)].
For uniform distributions, this entropic definition reduces to the volume of the
support. For a normal distribution of dimension K the volume is
(B.3) VΣ = (2pie)
K
2 |Σ| 12 ≈ (2pieσ2)K2 .
where the second equality only holds if Σ is proportional to the identity.
B.2 Showing I = I′ to zeroth order
The first term in the information difference
I ′(xN ) = Hˆ1|N−1 − HˆN |0(B.4)
=
(
Eθ
$(·|xN )
h(xN |θ)
)
− h(XN ) + O(N0)(B.5)
= Eθ
$(·|xN )
log
q(xN |θ)
q(xN )
+ O(N0).(B.6)
By multiplying the numerator and denominator by $(θ), we can identify this
first term as the KL divergence that we used to define I(xN )
= I(xN ) + O(N0)(B.7)
B.3 Significance level implied by a data partition
Under the assumption of the smaller model, the information difference is ex-
pected to be distributed like a 12χ
2 with ∆K degrees of freedom, where ∆K =
K2 −K1. The effective significance level αν is therefore
(B.8) αν = 1− CDF
[
χ2∆K
] (
∆K
[
1 + (1 + ν−1) log(1 + ν)
])
.
This function is plotted in Fig. 3 for two choices of the dimensional difference. An
interesting corollary is that for large ∆K, typical confidence levels may actually
be less than equivalent predictive methods such as AIC. In other words, we can
reject the null hypothesis before it become predictively optimal to use the larger
model.
APPENDIX C: OTHER METHODS
There are several methods that deviate more drastically from the standard
Bayesian probability calculus. We mention here just a few of the interesting ideas
which have been proposed.
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C.1 Other Predictive Estimators
Once a data division strategy is chosen and we can agree on what we are
trying to estimate, there are many information criteria which can be used. For
instance, the predictive limit can be estimated using AIC, DIC [16] and WAIC [2].
When the posterior is known to be approximately normal, AIC can perform with
minimal variance [30]. Far from normality and the large sample-size limit, WAIC
has a uniquely well developed justification in terms of algebraic geometry, but the
standard LOOCV seems to have better properties in numerical experiments [31].
Similar alternatives to BIC exist for postdictive performance estimation [2, 32].
C.2 Data-Validated Posterior and Double use of Data
Aitkin [14] attempted to address the Lindley paradox by proposing training
and validating the data using the entire dataset XN . The resulting posterior
Bayes factor comes from the observed posterior information:
(C.1) HPOBF(X
N ) = h(XN |XN )
This has a complexity KAitkin =
K
2 log 2 ≈ 0.35K. This is far too weak to realize
Occam’s razor. This weakness results from two effects: i.) We use here the a
generalization sample size of NG = N instead of the predictive limit where the
generalization sample size is zero. ii.) The double use of data means that the
posterior is over-fit to the particular dataset. This posterior appears to performs
better than even knowledge of the true parameter K0 =
K
2 . Overfitting can
also occur when data are double used implicitly through posterior training, as in
empirical Bayes methods where prior hyperparameters are optimized with respect
to the model information.
We do not believe that the double use of data is completely ruled out of a
principled statistical analysis [33]. But because double use of data is antithetical
to the interpretation of conditional probability, and because it very often leads
to overfitting, double use of data requires careful justification.
C.3 Fractional Bayes Factor
O’Hagan [20] sought to define a minimal training set mathematically by taking
some small power of the likelihood. The fractional model information is then
(C.2) HFBF(b) = logEθ
pi
qb(XN |θ)− logEθ
pi
q(XN |θ)
where b is chosen to be very small. If epsilon goes to zero, this expression is
obviously identical to the original model information. As O’Hagan notes “The
key question remaining in the use of FBFs is the choice of b. It may seem that the
only achievement of this paper is to replace an arbitrary ratio [i.e. NG/NT ] with
an arbitrary choice of b.” The same issues with defining a minimal experiment
for minimal training also arise for this approach.
APPENDIX D: EFFICIENCY AND CORRECT MODELS
The landmark treatment by J. Shao[23] and its discussion by Yang [34] are
sometimes viewed as supporting BIC and Bayes factors in certain situations. We
therefore wish to discuss this important work in more detail. We suppress many
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of the technical details for the purposes of our discussion, and refer to [23, 34] for
more precision.
Let αN0 be the identifier for the most predictive model at sample size N (which
may not be the true model!), and let αˆν(x
N ) identify the model chosen by select-
ing the largest pseudo-Bayes factor parameterized by ν. We can define the loss
ratio in terms of the predictive cross-entropy of the trained model,
ν(x
N ) ≡
EY h(Y |xN , αˆν(xN ))
EY h(Y |xN , αN0 )
,(D.1)
where the expectations are taken with respect to the true distribution. Shao iden-
tifies a reasonable criteria for the performance of a model estimator αˆ: asymptotic-
loss-efficiency which is equivalent to the condition that
ν(X
N )→p 1,(D.2)
That is, the loss ratio converges in probability to unity as the sample size goes
to infinity.
Shao found that the context in which model selection is performed is incredibly
important to whether or not asymptotic efficiency is achieved. Specifically, there
are two very different situations:
1. There is no correct model, or there is exactly one correct model which is
not nested inside a more complicated model.
2. There is more than one correct model. The smallest correct model is nested
inside potentially an infinite set of increasingly complicated models, which
are all capable of realizing the smaller model.
If condition (1) holds predictive methods (ν → 0) are guaranteed to be asymp-
totically efficient, and (pseudo-)Bayes factors for which ν > 0 are not guaranteed
to be asymptotically efficient. But if condition (2) holds, then statistical fluctua-
tions will cause AIC and pseudo-Bayesian methods to choose larger models than
α0 with a probability that never goes to zero. It is necessary for the penalty that
is, ν, to diverge to ensure that the probability of choosing a larger correct model
will converge to zero, and that asymptotic efficiency can be achieved.
If the possibility of condition (2), and the true model is realizable at finite
dimension, many would suggest that we are justified in using Bayesian methods
which have a divergent logN penalty and thus hope for asymptotic efficiency. We
criticize this position on several points.
First, condition (2) is unlikely to ever hold. The Boxian proverb, “All models
are wrong,” expresses the general truth that nature is too complicated to ever
yield the exact truth to a finite dimensional model. Condition (1) is far more
likely in any typical modeling context.
Second, whereas predictive methods occupy a unique place in relation to con-
dition (1), the rate at which penalties must go to infinity to satisfy efficiency
under condition (2) is not uniquely determined. All methods whose complexities
go to infinity slower than N , will (with some technical caveats) satisfy asymptotic
efficiency. A complexity of log logN would be no less favored under this argument
than the logN complexity of BIC.
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Finally, the asymptotic argument which prefers BIC under condition (2) seems
to have little bearing on the conditions we would observe at finite sample size. At
finite sample size, we do not know if we are in the regime where we are selecting
the true model, or if the true model cannot yet be resolved with the available
data. If the true model cannot be resolved, we’d still expect AIC to typically
outperform BIC for the same reasons that hold in condition (1). BIC is unjustified
unless we know a priori the scale at which a true effect will be observed. This
is exactly the situation which holds when we have a precise distribution for the
parameter of interest, and the Bayesian approach is indistinguishable from the
way the frequentist would use a priori information in accordance with the Bayes
law.
